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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this case under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented for appeal:
Issue 1: Did the trial court err in its application of the "private attorney general"
doctrine? An attorney fee decision that involves a question of law and a trial court's
interpretation of binding case law is reviewed for correctness. See A.K. & R. Whipple
Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, ^[6, 94 P.3d 270; Christiansen v. Farmers
Ins. Exck, 2005 UT 21, f7, 116 P.3d 259.
Issue 2: Did the trial court err in determining that it had no authority to award
attorneys' fees to the Culbertsons? An attorney fee decision that involves a question of
law and a trial court's interpretation of binding case law is reviewed for correctness. See
Whipple, 2004 UT 47,1f6; Christiansen, 2005 UT 21, f7.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
No such provisions apply to this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At issue is the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' (collectively referred to herein as
"the Culbertsons") motion for an equitable award of attorneys' fees, the final remedy
sought against the County in this extraordinary case.
In 2001, this Court consolidated appeals from grants of summary judgment in this
case and the related case of Johnson v. Hermes Associates, Ltd., et ai, Civil No.
960907123CV (3rd Dist. Ct.) (The "Hermes Action"), and found that the County and
Hermes had violated various zoning and roadway ordinances and a Conditional Use
Permit in building a shopping center adjacent to the Culbertsons' property. See
Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners, 2001 UT 108, 44 P.3d 642 (Ex. "A"
hereto). The Supreme Court remanded the case for entry of an appropriate remedy in the
Culbertsons' favor.
On remand in the Hermes Action, the district court granted the Culbertsons'
motion for injunctive relief, which was affirmed by this Court. See Johnson v. Hermes
Associates, Ltd, 2005 UT 82, 128 P.3d 1151, reh'g denied, 2006 Utah Lexis 21 (Utah
2006) (Ex. "B" hereto).
After that opinion was issued, the Culbertsons moved the trial court in this case for
an award of attorneys' fees against the County based on the court's inherent equitable
power and the "private attorney general" doctrine. [R. 3177, 3212-3219]. The
Culbertsons sought recovery of their attorneys' fees, costs, and litigation expenses
195478_2DOC
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incurred as a result of being required to bring this action to obtain enforcement of the
County zoning and roadway ordinances and Conditional Use Permit issued by the County
to Hermes. In addition, because the County's refusal to enforce its ordinances and the
Conditional Use Permit required Culbertson to sue Hermes to enjoin and remedy its
violations, the Culbertsons also sought recovery from the County of their attorneys' fees,
costs, and litigation expenses incurred in the Hermes Action. On May 12, 2006, the trial
court heard oral argument and denied the motion, holding that the "private attorney
general" doctrine did not apply and that it had no other power to award attorney fees. [R.
3588 p. 24]. On June 5, 2006, the trial court entered an Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion
for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs and Defendants' Motion to Strike. [R. 3569].
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The factual history of this case spans more than a decade. The facts material to
this appeal are extensively reported in this Court's opinions in Culbertson, 2001 UT 108
and Johnson v. Hermes Associates, Ltd., 2005 UT 82 , and are therefore only briefly
summarized here.
I.

The Property
The Culbertsons are owners of lots and homes located in the Fort Union area in

Midvale, Utah (the "Property"). [R. 2831-32.] For more than 100 years and through five
generations, members of the Griffiths and Croxford families have held title to and lived
upon that property. [R. 2832.] The Griffiths/Croxford homestead, which is still located
195478_2 DOC
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on the Property, was part of the original Fort Union and was constructed of hand-made
adobe brick. [R. 2832.] In 1981, Plaintiff Alayna Culbertson and her young son moved
from Oregon to Utah to care for her grandparents, Gene and Pearl Croxford, who were
then in their eighties and still living on the Property. [R. 2832.] Ms. Culbertson has lived
on the Property continuously for the last 22 years. [R. 2832.]
II.

The County's Involvement in the Shopping Center Construction
Hermes and/or its successors ("Hermes") developed, own, and lease Phase III of

the Family Center at Fort Union (the "Shopping Center"). [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, ^
2.] At the time the Shopping Center was being developed, it was located within
unincorporated Salt Lake County. The County was the governmental entity responsible
for approving all permits and plans relating to the development, and for ensuring that the
development complied with all applicable County ordinances, including ordinances
regulating streets, roads, and rights-of-way. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, f 2; R. 3059-61,
3066.]
Hermes was able to purchase the other property it was seeking for the Shopping
Center, but the Culbertsons refused to sell their Property to Hermes. In order to proceed
with the construction of the Shopping Center, Hermes needed the County to issue a
Conditional Use Permit, and also needed the County to close certain public streets.
[Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, K 2.] Therefore, Hermes agreed to defend and indemnify the
County in the event any third party (such as the Culbertsons) filed a lawsuit relating to
195478 2 DOC
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the County's violation of any public street, road, or public right-of-way in the
development area. [R. 2881, 2953, 2986.]
On July 8, 1994, the County granted Hermes a Conditional Use Permit for the
construction and development of the Shopping Center, [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, \ 5; R.
3063-64, 3079-81, 3083], and on or about August 10, 1994, the County Commission
adopted Ordinance No. 1275, which vacated and closed certain portions of North Union
Avenue, over the Culbertsons' objections prior to and at the Commission's hearing on the
subject. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, U 73; R. 3065, 3074-77, 3092-96, 2834, 2848-49.]
Then, in June 1995, after Hermes improperly constructed 1070 East Street and
North Union Avenue in violation of county roadway standards, the County Commission
purported to grant Hermes post facto exceptions to those standards, approving a
twenty-five-foot right-of-way and twenty-foot pavement width for the portion of North
Union Avenue and 1070 East providing access to the Property and approving exceptions
to the minimum roadway standards requiring a twenty-five-foot turning radius for the
intersection of, and a cul-de-sac at the north end of North Union Avenue. [Culbertson,
2001 UT 108, U 7; R. 3105.]
III.

The Culbertsons' Numerous Objections to the County
In March and April 1994, the Culbertsons attended hearings held by the Planning

Commission and filed an appeal regarding the proposed Shopping Center and the
issuance of a Conditional Use Permit to Hermes. The County Commission, however,
refused to hear the Culbertsons, appeal. [R. 3035-36.]
195478_2DOC
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Then, on or about June 20, 1994 - before any construction had begun on the
Shopping Center - the Culbertsons filed an action against the County challenging the
adoption of Ordinance 1275. The Culbertsons alleged that the roadway proposed by
Hermes and approved by the County adjacent to the Property violated the Roadway
Ordinance, that the County was refusing to enforce the Roadway Ordinance, and that the
County was refusing to enforce the conditions and requirements contained in the
Conditional Use Permit issued for construction of the Shopping Center. [Culbertson,
2001 UT108,H6n.4.]
On or about October 3, 1994, the Culbertsons, through counsel, notified Hermes
and the County that the footings for the Ernst Building encroached upon 1070 East Street,
restricting the Culbertsons' lawful access to their Property, and that Hermes would be
required to remove the footings. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, \ 6; R. 2835, 2851-52.] On
or about October 5, 1994, the Culbertsons, through counsel, again notified Hermes and
the County that the Ernst Building was being constructed within the right-of-way and
requested that the County enforce its Roadway Ordinance and applicable building codes.
[Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, ^ 6; R. 2835, 2854-55.]
On or about November 15, 1994, the Culbertsons, through counsel, notified
Hermes and the County that 1070 East Street and the portion of North Union Avenue
fronting the Culbertsons, Property violated the County Roadway Ordinance and that
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Hermes was in violation of its Conditional Use Permit. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, f 6;
R. 2836, 2856-57.]
In April 1995, after Judge Iwasaki dismissed without prejudice the Culbertsons'
claims relating to enforcement of the Roadway Ordinance, zoning ordinance, and the
Conditional Use Permit issued to Hermes, the Culbertsons undertook and completed the
three-step administrative remedy process requested by the County and outlined by the
Court. The Culbertsons again advised the County of the ordinance violations and
requested the County to enforce the ordinance. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, f 8; R. 2838.]
In particular, in or about April 1995, the Culbertsons advised Ken Jones, the Director of
Development Services for Salt Lake County, both orally and in writing, that Hermes was
in violation of the Roadway Ordinance, the zoning ordinance, and the Conditional Use
Permit issued for the Shopping Center. The Culbertsons urged the County to uphold
these ordinances and requirements. [R. 2838, 2869-73.]
In June 1995, prior to the County's approval of the post facto minimum roadway
exceptions, the Culbertsons attended a public hearing on these proposed exceptions and
reiterated their claims that Hermes and the County were proceeding in violation of the
Roadway Ordinance, the zoning ordinance, and the Conditional Use Permit. [Culbertson,
2001 UT 108,1 7; R. 3068-70, 3100, 3102-3114.]

195478_2.DOC
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IV.

The Improperly Constructed Roadways Are Public Streets
Both North Union Avenue and 1070 East are public streets. [Culbertson, 2001 UT

108, ^J43 and 46.] Those roadways are used by Midvale City to provide public services,
such as garbage collection and snow removal, by employees of the adjacent shopping
center, and by members of the public. [R. 2833.]
As constructed by Hermes, 1070 East Street and the portion of North Union
Avenue fronting the Culbertsons' Property failed to comply with the Roadway Ordinance
then in effect, and the Shopping Center failed to comply with the Conditional Use Permit.
[Culbertson, 2001 UT 108,ffi|35-36.]
V.

Course of Proceedings in the Trial Court and the "Aunt Gloria" Action
In 1995 and 1996, the Culbertsons re-filed this action against the County (the

"County Action") and initiated a lawsuit against Hermes (the "Hermes Action"), seeking
a declaration that the Shopping Center buildings were constructed in violation of the
County zoning ordinance, Roadway Ordinance, and Conditional Use Permit because they
were built without the proper setbacks, landscaping, and other applicable requirements,
and seeking enforcement of those ordinances. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, ^ 8.]
In September 1997, while the County Action and Hermes Action were pending,
Hermes paid for an out-of-state in-law relation of the Culbertsons, Gloria Croxford, to
file a lawsuit challenging the Culbertsons' ownership of the Property (the "Aunt Gloria
Action"). [R. 3118, 3123-26, 3137-39, 3141-42, 3144-45, 3147, and 3149-50.] Gloria
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Croxford was represented by the same lawyers who represented Hermes in the Hermes
Action, and Hermes paid her attorneys, fees. [R. 3118, 3123.]
The Culbertsons were required to defend against the Aunt Gloria Action and
necessarily incurred attorneys' fees, costs, and other litigation expenses in doing so. [R.
3232.] The claims asserted by Gloria Croxford, and engineered by Hermes, were without
merit. In September 1998, Third District Judge Anne Stirba granted summary judgment
to defendants in the Aunt Gloria Action (the Culbertsons) and dismissed Gloria
Croxfordrs claims with prejudice. [R. 3168-71.]
VI.

Course of Proceedings in the Utah Supreme Court
In a unanimous opinion in 2001, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the district

court's grant of summary judgment to the County and Hermes on the issue of whether the
Shopping Center violated the applicable zoning and roadway ordinances and the
Conditional Use Permit issued to Hermes. The Court held that Hermes and the County
had, indeed, violated the County zoning and roadway ordinances and Conditional Use
Permit by failing to provide the minimum setbacks, widths, turnarounds, turning radius,
highback curbs, gutters, sidewalks, landscaping, and other features required by the
ordinances and Conditional Use Permit. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108,fflf43, 46, 49, 56.]
The Court remanded both cases to the district court "to award the Plaintiffs a remedy in
accordance with this opinion." [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, % 57.]
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VII.

The Injunction Against Hermes
Upon remand in the Hermes Action, the district court granted the Culbertsons a

mandatory injunction on summary judgment requiring removal of the portions of the
buildings that were unlawfully constructed and reconfiguration of the roadways in
accordance with the zoning and roadway ordinances. [Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., Ltd,,
2005 UT 82, % 9.]
The Utah Supreme Court upheld this injunction on appeal, finding that because the
roadways were public, "'the County must comply with the [Conditional Use Permit] and
all other County zoning and roadway ordinances' and that to be in noncompliance would
be a violation of the Conditional Use Permit and zoning and roadway ordinances," and
that "the exceptions to the roadway standards were erroneously granted, which,
consequently, placed Hermes in noncompliance and resulted in an ordinance violation."
[Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., Ltd,, 2005 UT 82, ^} 28.]
VIII. Public Interest in this Litigation
The Culbertsons1 enforcement of the County's zoning and roadway ordinances has
been the subject of considerable public interest and attention and reporting by the local
news media. [R. 3229, 3251-60.]
Following the Utah Supreme Court's unanimous affirmance of the trial court's
mandatory injunction requiring demolition and reconfiguration of the Shopping Center
Buildings, the Salt Lake Tribune reported that the County Commissioners who approved
the development over the Culbertsons' repeated protests now admit they were wrong. [R.
195478_2DOC
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3228, 3244-47.] The Tribune reported that former County Commissioner Brent Overson
called his decision "the biggest mistake I ever made in my political career" and publicly
acknowledged the harm done to Pearl Meibos and her family. [Id.] Then Salt Lake
County Commissioner (now Council member) Randy Horiuchi also publicly apologized
for "sacrific[ing] the good of a small group of people to the interests of the taxpayers of
Salt Lake County." [R. 3228, 3249.] The Tribune quoted then Salt Lake County
Commissioner (now Council member) Jim Bradley, who voted against the illegal
development, describing the harm that the County and Hermes inflicted upon the
Culbertsons as follows: "The developer built the project around them in an atrocious
manner - a cinder-block fortress on three sides . . . They were bullied by the developer."
[R. 3228,3244-47.]
IX.

Reasonableness of the Culbertsons'Attorneys Fees, Costs, and Expenses
The Culbertsons' counsel submitted an affidavit specifying the attorneys' fees

requested and demonstrating the reasonableness of those fees. [R. 3225-34.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court only denied the Culbertsons' motion because it wrongly interpreted
the law to preclude it from awarding those fees unless the "private attorney general"
doctrine applied. In finding that the "private attorney general" doctrine did not apply
here, the trial court wrongly interpreted Stewart to require a comparison of the benefits
received by the litigants and the public. This was an incorrect interpretation of Stewart
195478 2 DOC
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and its progeny, and the trial court's analysis cannot be reconciled with the correct
interpretation of the law. Moreover, the trial court did not have to rely solely upon the
"private attorney general" doctrine to award the Culbertsons' their attorneys' fees, as the
trial court had the power to award the Culbertsons' their attorneys' fees under the court's
"inherent equitable power to award attorneys' fees." Accordingly, the trial court's denial
of the Culbertsons' motion for attorneys' fees was improper and should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
"If there were a doctrine either found in a statute or in an opinion that gave me
authority to award attorneys' fees if the County willfully violated its own ordinances, I
would not hesitate to do that in this case..." [R. 3588 p. 22.] This was the trial court's
first statement after oral argument on the Culbertsons' motion for attorneys' fees, and is a
clear indication of the trial court's view of the facts of this case. The Culbertsons are not
asking this Court to substitute its factual conclusions, reweigh the equities, or rebalance
the competing interests of justice. The trial court clearly felt that justice and equity
would be served by requiring the County to pay the attorneys' fees incurred by the
Culbertsons in enforcing the ordinances that the County willfully refused to enforce
itself.
However, the trial court concluded that the only possible authority for that award
was the "private attorney general" doctrine, and the trial court determined that the
Culbertsons did not meet the criteria of that doctrine after conducting a "benefits"
195478_2DOC
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comparison - an incorrect test under that doctrine. The trial court's determination
regarding the scope of its powers is a question of law, as is its interpretation of the test to
be applied under this Court's ruling in Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885
P.2d 759 (Utah 1994). See A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT
47,1|6, 94 P.3d 270; Christiansen v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 2005 UT 21,1(7, 116 P.3d 259.
It is these two errors of law that the Culbertsons now appeal.
I.

The Trial Court Incorrectly Applied the Private Attorney General Doctrine.
In denying the Culbertsons' motion, the trial court stated that the test for the

private attorney general doctrine was ''whether the plaintiffs' legal action, and the
specific relief secured as a result of the plaintiffs' action, primarily benefited the
plaintiffs individually or, rather, primarily benefited the public at large." [R. 3571, ^|5].
This is not the correct analysis under the "private attorney general" doctrine, and
therefore the trial court's conclusion and dismissal of the Culbertsons' motion was in
error.
In its leading decision on this issue, this Court stated that courts may award
attorneys' fees to a party as a "private attorney general" when the '" vindication of a
strong or societally important public policy' takes place and the necessary costs in doing
so 'transcend the individual plaintiffs' pecuniary interest to an extent requiring
subsidization.'" Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759, 783 (Utah
1994) (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303, 1314 (Cal. 1977)). Subsequent cases
have indicated that there are three elements to the private attorney general doctrine in
I95478_2DOC
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Utah: (1) whether a "strong or societally important public policy" has been vindicated,
(2) whether the necessary costs incurred by the plaintiff "transcend" the plaintiffs
pecuniary interest, and (3) whether the case is "extraordinary." See Stewart, 885 P.2d at
783; Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, % 24, 100 P.3d 1151; Utahnsfor Better Dental
Health-Davis v. Davis County, 2005 UT App 347, H 9, 121 P.3d 39.
The trial court did not address these criteria in its ruling, but instead chose to
compare the "benefits" received by the Culbertsons against the "benefits" received by the
public. However, a benefits comparison is not an element of the "private attorney
general" doctrine.1 While the trial court was not required to use the correct "buzzwords"
for its decision to be upheld, it does need to address the substance of the legal doctrine
under analysis. See Utahnsfor Better Dental Health, 2005 UT App 347, \ 9; cf
Shipman, 2004 UT 44, ^26-27. Because the trial court's analysis and order did not
address the substance of the "private attorney general" doctrine, the denial of the
Culbertsons' motion was in error.
A.

The Trial Court's Benefits Analysis Does Not Address the Policy and Purpose of
the Private Attorney General Doctrine.
The "private attorney general" doctrine is an equitable doctrine, and therefore its

overarching purpose is to further justice and equity. However, the doctrine has an

1

The source of the trial court's confusion may be that, in the Stewart opinion, this Court
approved of an award of attorneys' fees under the "substantial benefit" doctrine as well as
the "private attorney general" doctrine. See Stewart, 885 P.2d at 783.
195478 2 DOC

18

additional and more specific purpose - to encourage potential private litigants to assert
rights embodying important public interests that, due to the costs of litigation, might
otherwise go unenforced. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400,
402 (1968); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281, 285 (6th Cir.
1974); Wilderness Society v. Morton, 161 U.S. App. D.C. 446, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (en banc); Stolberg v. Trustees for State Colleges, 474 F.2d 485, 489-491 (2d Cir.
1973); Rowe, THE LEGAL THEORY OF ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW,
1982 Duke L.J. 651, 662-63 (September 1982).2
Unlike the "substantial benefit" doctrine or the "bad faith" doctrine, the "private
attorney general" doctrine does not operate as a reward or a punishment. Rather, it is
applied as an incentive to encourage parties to enter into certain litigation affecting public
interests. To accomplish this objective, the tests employed in applying the doctrine must
inquire into the party's pre-litigation motivations.3 See City of Sacramento v. Drew, 207
Cal. App. 3d 1287, 1301 1305 (Cal App. 3rd Dist. 1989); Woodland Hills Residents Ass %

2

The United States Supreme Court has since held that federal courts may not award
attorneys' fees under the "private attorney general" doctrine. See Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975). However, because the Utah
Supreme Court has adopted the "private attorney general" doctrine in this state, prior
federal jurisprudence on the subject is instructive.
3

Of course, the language in Stewart that an important public policy must be "vindicated"
implies that the outcome of the litigation must in some way further the public interest.
Whether the plaintiff must be victorious in the actual lawsuit or whether a "catalyst"
theory would apply in Utah is a question not raised in this appeal.
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Inc. v. Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 934 (Cal. 1979). The benefits comparison used by
the trial court fails to address this concern.
B.

The Trial Court's Order Did Not Address Whether a "Societally Important
Public Policy" Was At Issue.
The trial court correctly noted that an award of attorneys' fees is not appropriate in

"every case where the law is vindicated in an action against a governmental agency."
[R.3588 p. 3.] The first prong of the "private attorney general" doctrine addresses this
concern, requiring the court to determine whether the public policy served by the
litigation is sufficiently strong that encouragement of private litigation to enforce that
policy is warranted. See Serrano, 569 P.2d p. 1314-15. The focus of this analysis is the
importance of the public policy that is vindicated by the litigation. The plaintiffs stake
in the litigation is irrelevant to this particular prong of the doctrine, and instead is
addressed in the other elements of the doctrine. This is admittedly a difficult standard for
a court to apply, illustrated by the trial court's difficulty in this case where it stated, with
no further detail, that "90% of the benefit of the relief obtained inured to the plaintiffs as
individuals." [R. 3572]. The trial court clearly found that there was a measurable public
benefit conferred by this litigation (the remaining 10%). However, the trial court did not
identify the public interests that it found were at issue, and failed to evaluate the societal
importance of those interests.
The trial court's benefits comparison did not achieve the same purpose as an
evaluation of the importance of society's interest in the litigation. That the Culbertsons
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are geographically closer than the rest of the "public" to the site of the zoning violation
condoned by the County tells us nothing about the importance of the public policies at
issue. Nor does the fact that the Culbertsons were found to have a special injury
sufficient for standing to obtain an injunction. Indeed, if either of those facts were
determinative to the "private attorney general" doctrine, zoning violations would be
categorically removed from the ambit of the doctrine, as the two facts described above
(and relied upon by the trial court in denying the Culbertsons' motion [R. 3588 pp. 3-4]]
are always present in zoning litigation where injunctive relief is sought. Such a per se
rule is inappropriate for this equitable doctrine, since there are circumstances, such as
this, where litigation over a zoning issue warrants an award of attorney fees under the
"private attorney general" doctrine. See, e.g., Starbirdv. County of San Benito, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 149, 153 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (by pursuing an action to invalidate land use permits
and ordinances, Culbertson "vindicated important rights of the people of San Benito
County which were ignored by the officials charged with enforcing them"); Friends of
"B" Street v. City ofHayward, 165 Cal. Rptr. 514, 517-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (finding
attorneys fees appropriate under private attorney general doctrine where Plaintiffs
challenged a road project that did not comply with state law and local ordinances).
A closer analysis of Stewart is helpful in this regard. In Stewart, the court found
that the Public Service Commission had violated the law in the way it approved certain
rates to be charged by US West. See Stewart, 885 P.2d at 773. No money was awarded
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by that decision, merely a reversal of the Commission's approval of the rates. This Court
approved an award of attorneys' fees in that case under the "private attorney general"
doctrine if no monetary recovery was made. See id. at 783-84. The actual monetary
benefit that each particular member of the public reaped from the Stewart litigation (if
any) was relatively small, likely averaging only a few dollars per month. Nevertheless,
the Utah Supreme Court found that an important public policy was vindicated by the
litigation. See id. Presumably the Utah Supreme Court would have reached the same
result even if one of the named plaintiffs in Stewart had an exceptionally large phone bill.
The "special injury" or specific concrete benefit received by virtue of litigation is not the
focus of the "private attorney general" doctrine. The "important public policies" at issue
in Stewart, rather, were in remedying the "abdication by the Commission of its statutory
duties" and preventing US West "from using its monopoly power to charge exploitive
rates." Id. at 771 and 774.
The parallels to this case are clear. The County not only "abdicated" its role as the
enforcer of zoning regulations, it was knowingly and intentionally complicit in the
violation of those ordinances. See Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, ^[56 ("By allowing Hermes
to proceed, the County stepped into the quagmire we condemned in Springville Citizens
for a Better Community v. City of Springville, where we emphasized that local zoning
authorities 'are bound by the same terms and standards of applicable zoning ordinances
and are not at liberty to make land use decisions in derogation thereof" (quoting
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Springville Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. City of Springville, 729 P.2d 332, 337-38 (Utah
1999))). In addition, the public policies served by zoning ordinances, which were
enforced by the Culbertsons in this litigation, are of enormous importance: preserving
the aesthetics of the community, safety of the citizens when traveling the roadways of the
community, and access by police, firemen, emergency personnel, and sanitation for all of
the County's current and future residents. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-102; Salt Lake
Co. Ord. § 19.02.020. That the Culbertsons may drive on the public roadways they
vindicated more frequently than other members of the public is irrelevant.
Because the trial court's analysis and order failed to evaluate the "important public
policies" served by this litigation, the denial of the Culbertsons' motion was in error and
should be reversed.
C.

The Trial Court Did Not Determine Whether the Litigation Expenses
Transcended Culbertson's Pecuniary Interest.
The second test for the "private attorney general" doctrine is a comparison of the

costs of the litigation against the Culbertsons' expected pecuniary benefit. Stewart, 885
P.3d at 783. Unlike the test used by the trial court, this prong of the doctrine tests the
pre-litigation motives of the plaintiff by requiring the court to determine "whether the
individual stake of the litigant would have been sufficient in its own right to have
motivated his participation in the litigation." Drew, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 1305.
A comparison of the costs of pursuing this action and the injunctive relief claim of
the Hermes Action against the Culbertsons1 individual financial stake in the outcome is
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simple and striking. The Culbertsons had no pecuniary interest in the outcome of the
County Action, and no prospect of a pecuniary windfall. They simply sought to have the
County do what it was mandated to do by state statute and County ordinance - enforce
the County's zoning and roadway ordinances and Conditional Use Permit. Likewise, the
Culbertsons had no pecuniary interest in the outcome of the injunctive relief claim in the
Hermes Action. The Culbertsons' only other stake in the outcome of the litigation, i.e.
their interest in safe and accessible roadways and the aesthetics of the community, are
interests the Culbertsons' share with every other resident of the County. Notwithstanding
this complete lack of any expectation of a monetary reward at the end of the day, the
Culbertsons have incurred attorneys' fees and costs in at least the amount of $451,142.78.
[R. 3231].
The trial court's benefits analysis failed to include any comparison of the costs of
this litigation to the Culbertsons' pecuniary interest, and therefore the trial court's
decision and order was in error and should be reversed.
D.

The Trial Court Did Not Determine Whether This Case Is Extraordinary.
Finally, the trial court made no finding that this case was not "extraordinary."4

This Court has stated that the private attorney general doctrine is limited in application to
"extraordinary cases." Stewart, 885 P.3d at 783. It has also described the test for

Of course, had the trial court made such a finding, it would have been astonishing,
given the language of this Court's prior opinions in this case and the trial court's own
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determining whether a case is "extraordinary" - "that 'but for' Plaintiffs action, the ill
could not have been cured." Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, \ 24, 100 P.3d 1151. Here,
it is the very public entity charged with enforcing zoning and roadway ordinances that
willfully refused to do so. In these situations, "the necessity of private enforcement is
obvious ... private citizens alone must 'guard the guardians' and the disparity in legal
resources is likely to be greatest." Drew, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
In this respect, the facts of this case eclipse those of Stewart, because the County
not only willfully refused to enforce its own ordinances, it systematically engaged in
conduct designed to displace the governmental obligation of enforcement of laws onto
the shoulders of the Culbertsons. The County entered into an indemnification agreement
with Hermes whereby Hermes was to defend and indemnify the County in the event any
third party filed a legal challenge relating to the County's violation of any public street,
road, or public right-of-way in the development area. [R. 2881, 2953 and 2986.] After
securing Hermes' indemnification, the County ignored the Culbertsons1 repeated oral and
written notices that Hermes was violating the conditions of its Conditional Use Permit
and the County's zoning and roadway ordinances, and the County refused the
Culbertsons' repeated requests that it enforce its zoning and roadway ordinances and

statements that the County willfully violated ordinances and that the trial court would not
have hesitated to award attorneys' fees if it had felt it had the authority.
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Conditional Use Permit against Hermes. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, ^ 6-8 and n.4; R.
2835-36, 2838, 2851-52, 2854-57, 2869-73, 3035-36, 3068-70, 3100 and 3102-3114.]
Finally, after allowing Hermes to construct the substandard roadway in front of the
Culbertsons' property, the County attempted to excuse its unlawful conduct by granting
Hermes after-the-fact exceptions to its roadway ordinance, remarkable conduct that this
Court had little trouble striking down as illegal. See Culbertson, 2001 UT 108, ^| 49.
The County's actions made it necessary for the Culbertsons to pursue this lawsuit
and the Hermes Action, and to defend against the Hermes-orchestrated Aunt Gloria
Action, if the County zoning and roadway ordinances were to be enforced. Enforcement
of the County's ordinances is a legal obligation that should have been assumed by the
County. When the County illegally abdicated this obligation, the Culbertsons had no
choice but to step in and essentially perform a governmental function in enforcing those
ordinances. This is precisely the type of case that meets the Utah Supreme Court's
definition of "extraordinary" and warrants an award of attorneys' fees under the private
attorney general doctrine. Had the County simply fulfilled its duty at the outset, this
expense would have been avoided. It is only fair and equitable for the County to bear the
cost that its intransigence has imposed on the Culbertsons and to repay the
disproportionate burden that the Culbertsons have borne in doing what the County would
not.
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II.

The Trial Court Erred in Determining That It Had No Authority to Award
Attorneys' Fees in This Case.
The trial court focused its analysis to the question of whether fees could be

awarded under the "private attorney general" doctrine5, concluding that doctrine was the
only possible authority it had to award attorneys' fees in this case. However, the "private
attorney general" doctrine is simply a subset of a larger equitable power recognized by
this Court — that "in the absence of a statutory or contractual authorization, a court has
inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees when it deems it appropriate
in the interest of justice and equity." Stewart, 885 P.2d at 782 (Utah 1994) (citing Hall v.
Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973)); see also Utahns For Better Dental Health, 2005 UT App
347, If 6; Cafferty v. Hughes, 2002 UT App. 105, J 23, 46 P.3d 233.
This Court has identified many categories of cases in which an equitable award of
attorneys' fees is appropriate: where a party acts vexatiously or in bad faith, certain class
actions, certain actions by a beneficiary against a trustee, the "substantial benefit"
doctrine, the "common fund" and the "private attorney general" doctrine. However,
those categories do not limit the trial court's authority, but are merely examples of
circumstances that warrant the exercise of this power. See Stewart, 885 P.2d at 782-83;
see also Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Jensen is particularly
significant in this context. In Jensen, the plaintiff was appointed guardian of the

5

The trial court also stated that the third party litigation and "common fund" doctrines
were inapplicable. [R. 3570.] Neither of those doctrines is at issue in this appeal.
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defendant's minor child and sued the defendant for child support. See Jensen, 892 P.2d
at 1053. The trial court awarded the plaintiff attorneys fees, and although the Court of
Appeals noted that there was no statutory or contractual basis for this award, the Court of
Appeals, citing to Stewart, affirmed the award of attorneys' fees based upon the court's
"inherent equitable power" and the specific facts of the case:
In this case, Jensen not only had to provide support for David, but was also
required to finance legal fees to compel Bowcut to fulfill his statutory
obligations and duties to David. Similar to the examples set forth above,
Jensen expended her time and resources for the benefit of another-in this
case, for the support of a minor. We believe that under these circumstances,
equity demands the award of attorney fees. Moreover, the award of fees in
this case was, in reality, simply a part of the child support award itself since
the fees went to reimburse Jensen for her "support" of David. Therefore,
while the trial court improperly based its award of attorney fees on statutory
grounds, we nevertheless affirm the award based on principles of equity
and justice as they relate to the specific circumstances of this case.
Id. (emphasis added).
A trial court has the authority to award attorneys' fees in any case in which justice
and equity require such an award. Certainly the facts of this case justify the exercise of
this power. Here, the Culbertsons notified the County of the violations of zoning and
roadway ordinances, fully expecting the County to do its job and enforce its own laws.
[Culbertson, 2001 UT 108,ffi|6-8 and n.4; R. 2835-36, 2838, 2851-52, 2854-57, 286973, 3035-36, 3068-70, 3100 and 3102-3114.] In the face of these repeated notices, the
County not only refused to enforce its ordinances, but affirmatively assistedHermes in
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violating those ordinances by granting illegal exceptions and attempting to ratify
violations after they had occurred. [Culbertson, 2001 UT 108,ffl|43, 46, 49, 56.]
The balance of the equities are not even in question here. As the trial court stated,
"[i]f there were a doctrine either found in a statute or in an opinion that gave me authority
to award attorneys' fees if the County willfully violated its own ordinances, I would not
hesitate to do that in this case..." [R. 3588 p. 22 (emphasis added).] If this Court finds
that this case is not encompassed by the "private attorney general" doctrine because the
Culbertsons suffered a "special injury" sufficient to obtain injunctive relief, then an entire
category of deserving plaintiffs will be effectively denied a remedy and will be denied
recourse when their government fails them. A more inequitable result is hard to imagine,
and this Court should specifically recognize that plaintiffs who must take on the type of
public enforcement role forced on the Culbertsons here, in the face of opposition from the
very government charged with protecting their rights, are entitled to recover their
attorneys' fees from that governmental entity.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's denial of the Culbertsons' motion for attorneys' fees should be
reversed. The trial court denied the Culbertsons' motion because it wrongly interpreted
the law to preclude it from awarding those fees unless the "private attorney general"
doctrine applied, and it wrongly interpreted Stewart to require a comparison of the
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benefits received by the litigants and the public in applying that doctrine. Both of these
conclusions are incorrect as a matter of law and should be reversed.
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - MAY 12, 2006

2

JUDGE ANTHONY B. QUINN PRESIDING

3

P-4V-0-€-fi-E--BHE--M-6--S

4

THE COURT:

Let'S go on the record in the matter of

5

Culbertson vs. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake.

6

Please state your appearances.

7

MR. HUNT:

Good morning Your Honor, Jeff Hunt and

8

David Reymann for the plaintiffs.

9

MR. TSAKALOS:

10
11

T. J. Tsakalos for the County, Your

Honor and with me is Don Hansen.
THE COURT:

All right.

We're here today on the

12

plaintiff's Motion to Awarded Attorney's fees and costs

13

associated really with both this action and the action that was

14

consolidated against Hermes, at least for purposes of appeal.

15

I have read all the memos that have been submitted with respect

16

to this motion.

17

selectively from the exhibits.

18

tentative views are and then give you a chance to respond.

19

I've read most of the cases.

I've read

I'm going to tell you what my

I guess I start with two propositions that in my mind

20

set forth the dilemma that I face as a judge in this case.

21

First is a sense of almost outrage at the County's conduct in

22

this case which the Supreme Court of Utah had characterized as

23

a willful, deliberate violation of the law.

24

placed on notice for years that their conduct was in violation

25

of the law, their insistence on going forward with providing

Despite being

1

exceptions to the law for the purposes of allowing this

2

development to go forward is really, really troubling.

3

The second proposition is that I take a conservative

4

view of my power as a district court judge and struggle to find

5

an exception to the general rule that unless provided for by

6

contract or statute, that I don't have the authority to grant

7

attorney's fees to prevailing party in civil litigation.

8
9

The first theory that's advanced that would allow me
to grant attorney's fees in this case is the Private Attorney

10

General Exception and I really don't find that particularly

11

applicable to the facts in this case because I believe that the

12

specific results obtained in this case primarily benefitted the

13

plaintiffs and not the public as a whole.

14

proposition that whenever the power of government is restrained

15

by the acts of its citizens and brought in conformance with the

16

law, that every member of the public benefits to some degree

17

but I don't believe that the Private Attorney General Exception

18

is intended to extend to all those situations where the power

19

of government is restrained by civil litigation filed on behalf

20

of particular plaintiffs.

21

situations, then the dog license analogy advanced by the County

22

would be an apt analogy because if, contrary to law, a dog

23

licese were granted or denied, that would be as arbitrary a use

24

of government power as that which we are seeing in this case

25

and there's a public interest in that not happening and it

I accept the general

If it included all of those

j

1

relates to the safety of the public because a dog license

2

insures that rabies vaccinations occur and other things and so

3

to some extent, every member of the public would benefit by the

4

restraint of government power in that case.

5

be a way to draw a line so that not every case where the law is

6

vindicated in an action against a governmental agency,

7

attorney's fees are awarded and I think that the line that has

8

been drawn by the Supreme Court in the Stewart case with

9

respect to the Private Attorney General Exception is you look

But there has to

10

to the specific relief obtained and you determine whether that

11

specific relief benefitted the public as a whole or whether the

12

benefit was primarily for the benefit of those individual

13

plaintiffs.

14

Interestingly, plaintiffs in this case succeeded in

15

getting an injunction in the Hermes action and took the

16

position in that case that they suffered a special private

17

injury.

18

someplace. This is on page 4, at least of the Lexus, it looks

19

like it's Page 14 of the Pacific Report.

20

states in that case, "We have defined special damages in the

21

context of zoning violation of damage over and above the public

22

injury which may be caused by the violation of the zoning

23

ordinance.

24

substantially more than those of the general community.

25

only landowner surrounded on three sides by Hermes expansion

If you look at the Johnson case which I've got here

The Supreme Court

The damages need only different kind or be
As the

1

Appellees have obviously suffered a different and more

2

substantial impact than any other landowners near the Family

3

Center.

4

Appellees are the only homeowners whose residential property is

5

within feet of the shopping center and who have been affected

6

in kind by Hermes' substandard roadway construction and non-

7

compliance."

8

the Supreme Court makes a finding of specific and discreet

9

injury to these plaintiffs as opposed to the public at large as

The record unequivocally reflects the fact that

Well, it goes on but at the plaintiff's urging,

10

a condition to approving injunctive relief in this case which,

11

it's not a mirror image of the issue that I'm facing but it's

12

close because I would have to find in order to grant attorney's

13

fees that the specific relief - this is my view of the law,

14

that the specific relief obtained in this case benefitted the

15

public as a whole virtually to the same extent as they did the

16

plaintiffs in this case and for that reason I don't think that

17

Private Attorney General Exception applies.

18

Secondly, with respect to the third party litigation

19

section, that is not a reflection of the Court's equitable

20

power to grant attorney's fees to a prevailing party in limited

21

circumstances.

22

been recognized in limited circumstances whereas one of the

23

items of damage that a plaintiff may obtain, he can obtain the

24

costs of pursuing litigation against a third party if it's

25

proximately caused by the negligent act of another or if it's,

That is simply a measure of damage that has

1

in the contract section, it's a consequential damage of the

2

breach of contract or another*

3

one, fits into that but even more importantly, having checked

4

the complaint in this case, the corrected amended complaint

5

which I believe is the most recent complaint filed, no claim

6

for damages at all.

7

claim and I can't award damages where none were prayed in the

8

complaint.

9
10

I don't think this case, number

So I can't simply award - this is a damage

So anyway, that's my tentative assessment.

Mr. Hunt, I'll give you a chance to demonstrate the
error of my analysis.

11

MR. HUNT:

Thank you, Your Honor.

I want to thank

12

you for your comments.

13

neglected to introduce my client, Pearl Mybois, who is in court

14

today as well and seated to her right is her father, Blaine

15

Johnson as well and I wanted to introduce them to the Court.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. HUNT:

It will help focus my argument.

Thank you.

I

It's nice to have them here.

Your Honor, also I may make reference to

18

two demonstrative exhibits which are in the record, have been

19

admitted in this case and I'd like to turn those around if I

20

may.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. HUNT:

Of course.
I've shown these to counsel prior to Your

23

Honor coming on the bench.

Just to introduce the exhibits,

24

this is the plat that was attached to the Conditional Use

25

Permit that the County issued to Hermes to construct the

1

shopping center addition.

So what this does is depicts the

2

roadways and the Croxford property in relation to the shopping

3

center development.

4

shaded in yellow, 1070 E. Street which the Supreme Court found

5

was a public street is right here abutting the west and North

6

Union Avenue which the Supreme Court found is a public street

7

abuts to the north of the property.

8

and the property to give Your Honor a visual depiction and then

9

this, of course, is a photograph taken by Pearl Mybois at

The Croxford property is identified there,

So these are the roadways

10

approximately 1999 after the construction had occurred in a

11

photograph, before the construction had occurred and you can

12

see here what the problem was here building the shopping center

13

directly on the roadway with no setbacks, sidewalks, which the

14

Supreme Court found was illegal.

15

I'd like to focus on the Private Attorney General

16

Doctrine and that specific requirement that Your Honor has

17

honed in on which I agree is at the heart of our motion and

18

which I'd like an opportunity to try to change Your Honor's

19

mind on.

20

and Hermes which the Court in a very unusual opinion strongly

21

condemned in the Hermes and Culbertson opinions and I would

22

submit to Your Honor that even taking a conservative view of

23

Your Honor's powers, it's clear under the Stewart case that you

24

do have inherent equitable power to make an award of attorney's

25

fees and costs when you deem appropriate in the interests of

This was outrageous conduct engaged in by the County

1

justice and equity*

2

in the Stewart case and they went on in that case to say, one

3

of the ways you can do that is the Private Attorney General

4

Doctrine where in essence the plaintiff, the litigant has to

5

take on the role of the attorney general to obtain enforcement

6

of the laws and that's exactly the case that we have here, Your

7

Honor.

8
9

Those are the words of the Supreme Court

My clients did everything within their power to get
Salt Lake County to enforce the law in this case.

This was not

10

a case like a dog license or a challenge of a refusal to issue

11

a dog license or even a challenge, as the County makes argument

12

in their brief, of the issuance of the CUP, the Conditional Use

13

Permit.

14

don't issue the CUP.

15

development.

16

is not the analogy to this case.

17

of all, if you're going to build the shopping center addition,

18

you can't do it with tax subsidies and they took that case to

19

the Utah Supreme Court and won.

20

there was a ruling that tax subsidies could not be used for the

21

shopping center expansion.

22

development, bought out all of the homeowners adjacent to the

23

development with the exception of one, my clients.

24

descendants of the Croxford and Griffiths family who have been

25

living on this property for 100 years refused to sell.

We never challenged that.

We never said, County,

We never said, County, don't approve the

We never said, don't issue the dog license.

That

What my client said is first

They invalidated the RDA and

After that they went ahead with the

The

So what

1

did they do?

2

commercial buildings, 200,000 square feet of commercial

3

buildings, in excess of 25 feet just literally casting a shadow

4

over the property because they built it right on the road.

5

The enveloped the property on three sides with

Before they did that, before the County allowed them

6

to do that, my clients said, County, we understand that they

7

can build their shopping center addition but they need to obey

8

the laws.

9

that are in effect.

They need to obey the zoning and roadway ordinances
I think that's what distinguishes this

10

case.

This is a case where we have, and this is what makes it

11

a more general application.

12

impacted by development in this state including this county

13

should have the right to rely on the government authority that

14

has enforcement power to protect their rights, to protect their

15

rights with respect to that development, to make sure that it

16

complies with the existing public safety laws which are

17

intended to benefit not just the property owners that live

18

right next to it, but everybody, everybody that is in the

19

jurisdiction of those ordinances and laws has the benefit of

20

them and that's all my clients did.

21

allow them to build their buildings on the roadway without the

22

setbacks, without the sidewalks, without the legally required

23

width, without the legally required turning radius.

24

illegal.

25

said no, after they tore out the road, they went in and tried

Stop them.

All property owners that are

They said, County, do not

And the County said no.

That's

They not only

8

1

to fix it with their after-the-fact exceptions to the roadway

2

ordinance which the Supreme Court condemned.

3

And my argument to Your Honor is simply that there is

4

a broader public policy at issue here in allowing residents to

5

rely on the government authority that has enforcement

6

responsibility to do their job and in this case, they didn't do

7

their job and why didn't they do their job?

8

we submit is because they sought contractual indemnification

9

from the party that they were suppose to enforce those

10

One of the reasons

ordinances against and —

11

THE COURT:

Mr. Hunt, let me focus you on what I

12

think is missing in this case because like I said before, I

13

think whenever citizens take action to check unreasonable use

14

of government power, we all benefit.

15

specific relief that they had obtained in this case - and I'm

16

not saying that it would have been a relief that's available or

17

that would have been a good injunction, but if they had gotten

18

an injunction saying that the County may never again approve a

19

development without appropriate setbacks and roadways that

20

comply with law, that's a good argument for application of

21

Private Attorney General Exception but the specific relief they

22

got in this case really only benefits them as owners of the

23

property.

24
25

If they had, as the

That's where I'm trying to draw the line.
MR. HUNT:

Sure, and I'd like to suggest that the

impact was broader than that and here's why.

After we get

1

these roads reconfigured after Hermes complies with the Court's

2

injunction, we're going to have roadways that are of legal

3

width with the legal turning radius here and a legal turnaround

4

here with setbacks and side blocks and if you look at the

5

benefit, every member of the public - these are public roads.

6

They tried to argue they were private roads but they're not.

7

The Supreme Court said these are public roads.

8

the public that drives along these roadways, every emergency

9

personnel that uses those roadways, sanitation, snowplow

Every member of

10

drivers, ambulances will be able to have access that is on

11

legally required roads with legal turnarounds and legal widths,

12

legal setbacks.

13

public to walk on sidewalks than it is on the middle of the

14

road.

15

It's obviously much safer for members of the

Now, you may say well, but it's a dead-end street,

16

the only people that go down there would be people that have an

17

interest in going to this property.

18

We've got commercial buildings here that have access for the

19

loading docks and a trash compacting facility.

20

vehicles that use that.

21

public at large in making sure that those vehicles travel on

22

roadways that are safe and in fact, Your Honor, this inures to

23

the benefit of every single family that is going to live on

24

this property in the future.

25

that's true, that as the Court said, they were the ones that

That's not quite true.

So we have

There's a safety interest in the

Right now it's my client's,

10

1

were disproportionally impacted by the violation but there are

2

going to be other families living on that property.

3

it's Elaina Culbertson.

4

moved there in 1981 to care for her 80-year old grandparents

5

who were living on the homestead.

6

other families there and people that travel along that roadway,

7

those

8

the public.

9

public has the right to travel and I think that the safety

Right now

She's lived there for 25 years.

She

But there are going to be

public streets are all going to benefit, every member of
These are public roads that every member of the

10

illustration, the safety issue with those streets was

11

illustrated just last month when there was an individual who

12

called for 911 on the property and because of the

13

configuration, illegal reconfiguration of these roads, couldn't

14

find the property, got there too late and the individual died.

15

It was covered in the newspapers last month.

16

dramatic illustration of the unsafe condition of these roadways

17

and because of the relief that my client sought, not just sort

18

of the general policy, I mean, there's different levels of

19

generality, you're right, that you can look at this.

20

look at it in terms of enforcing the laws generally when an

21

entity has been put on notice they're violating them, whether

22

that indicate an important social policy, but also at a more

23

micro level, the specific relief here is going to benefit all

24

members of the public, all future people who live on that

25

property and you can't, you know, who knows where these road

That's just a

You can

11

1

are going to go eventually?

But when they are extended if they

2

ever are, they're going to be the legally required widths and

3

turning radius, etc., that comply with the ordinances.

4

And I think to address Your Honor's point about the

5

special damage and the Supreme Court opinion in Culbertson, I

6

thought about that and I think it's important to draw the

7

distinction between what the Court was talking about there and

8

what we're talking about here.

9

special damages that my clients were required to prove to have

The Court was talking about the

10

standing.

It was a standing analysis, in order to get the

11

injunctive relief that we were requesting and what the Court

12

said was, we want to appropriately narrow the class of people

13

that are entitled to that type of relief and if you're out

14

somewhere else in the county, you shouldn't be able to come in

15

say Hermes ought to tear their illegally constructed buildings

16

down.

17

over and above the general public and we obviously do.

18

not denying that, that we're impacted in a way that is more

19

severe than the general public, but I don't think that is

20

necessarily the same thing as saying that the public is not

21

deriving a benefit by the relief that we obtained in this case.

22

I don't think that's the same thing.

23

then every time a party was entitled to injunctive relief,

24

mandatory injunctive relief to require buildings to be torn

25

down, to remedy a violation of the zoning ordinance, you'd

You need to have some kind of special injury to yourself
We're

If that were the case,

12

1

never be entitled to attorney's fees under the Private Attorney

2

General Doctrine and I think that's a harsh, inequitable

3

result.

4

intended in Stewart and I don't think that they, frankly were

5

thinking about this particular case in Stewart but it is an

6

extraordinary case and they did say it takes the extraordinary

7

case and the Shipman case later, they say it takes the

8

extraordinary case.

9

but in a different way.

I don't think that was the result that the Court

And my argument that it is extraordinary
You're right, it didn't create a fund

10

that's going to benefit a large group of people.

It didn't

11

create a law or a rule of the court that says that all

12

government entities need to comply with their zoning laws but I

13

think that they didn't say that because it's self-evident.

14

mean, the government entities are charged with enforcing the

15

law and in this case they were put on notice that they weren't

16

doing that and they went ahead anyway.

17

anyway.

18

the place where we should have been in 1995 and I think that

19

that process of saying that not just the developers but as Mr.

20

Horouchi called them in his opinion column in the Tribune that

21

small groups of people, he called us a small group of people

22

that were sacrificed for the good of the taxpayers.

23

groups of people are entitled to the benefit of the law too,

24

not just developers that indemnify the County against risks

25

like this lawsuit which by the way County has filed as Your

I

They went forward

For 10 years we had to fight them to finally get to

Small

13

1

Honor probably know, a third party complaint against Hermes

2

under that indemnification provision saying if the Court awards

3

any fees, those fees should be paid by Hermes, pursuant to that

4

contractual indemnification and I think there is a public

5

policy in vindicating that aspect of the case, that a County

6

simply can't abdicate its enforcement authority to a private

7

developer and say, you know, if it all shakes out bad, you guys

8

are on the hook.

9

vindicated in this case and would be with an award of fees that

10

the County needs to take responsibility for its illegal actions

11

and this isn't a discretionary call by the County that we're

12

challenging.

13

court determined it was arbitrary and capricious and overturned

14

it.

15

your shopping center but, you know, you can't squeeze these

16

people like you did.

17

violation of the existing laws and that's what we think is the

18

public policy that we've vindicated.

19

it's inequitable to say that just because it's a dead end

20

street that we don't qualify for the Private Attorney General

21

Doctrine in the award of fees in this case.

22

that's one way you could look at it if the street went through,

23

more cars would be going along it.

24

the relevant fact, at least that's what we would suggest to

25

Your Honor.

There ought to be a policy which I think was

It's not like they made a zoning decision and the

That's not this case.

This case is, yeah, you can build

You can't envelope them like you did in

It can't be - we think

I mean, I guess

I don't think that that's

It's the fact that it's a public road, it's a
14

1

public right-of-way, public sidewalks and every member of the

2

public once those are constructed will have the benefit of

3

safer streets and safer sidewalks and safer access for the

4

emergency personnel and that public safety is recognized in

5

Salt Lake County's own ordinance which is the ordinance that we

6

vindicated in this case, the safety from fire and other

7

dangers, adequate light and air, protection of the urban

8

environment.

9

So I understand Your Honor's concern.

It is the

10

concern with the application in this case but I think if you

11

look at it both on the broader policy level and then the

12

specific results that we obtained here, not just for our

13

clients but for every member of the public, we qualify under

14

the Private Attorney General Doctrine for recovery of fees and

15

this isn't a far fetched notion.

16

other cases in California that have applied the doctrine in

17

this context and the —

18

THE COURT:

We cited the Court to the

They have a specific statute in

19

California that's broad enough to cover land use decisions

20

which we are lacking here in Utah.

21

MR. HUNT:

I would just argue by analogy that the

22

Court in Stewart did rely heavily on the Cerono decision in

23

California for recognition of the doctrine and the other

24

California cases we cited did apply it in the context of zoning

25

violations and ordinance violations.
15

1

So, you know, I don't think it's the dog license

2

case.

This is a truly extraordinary situation where you had

3

the entity that was responsible for protecting the public

4

including my clients, refusing to enforce the law after being

5

put on notice and then trying to fix it with their after-the-

6

fact exceptions.

7

that condemns that kind of conduct that says, you know, that

8

kind of conduct won't be tolerated.

9

too and everybody that lives next to shopping centers or

There's an interest in vindicating a result

These people have rights

10

commercial developments have rights that need to be protected.

11

We think we've indicated that interest in this case and we've

12

indicated the more practical public safety, health and safety

13

interest of driving on safe roadways.

14

And just finally, Your Honor, just to touch on sort

15

of the balancing points here, weighing my client's personal

16

gain here versus the cost that they incurred in prosecuting

17

this litigation.

18

The only thing that they ever wanted was compliance with the

19

law.

20

have been with legally required setbacks with some landscaping,

21

sidewalk, the turning radius that should have been in the cul-

22

de-sac.

23

Hermes litigation which we were - they were a necessary part.

24

We had to sue Hermes to get this relief and that's why we think

25

we're entitled for the Hermes fees as well under the equitable

They're not getting any pecuniary benefit.

They wanted a road that was legally as wide as it should

And now we're going to get that as a result of the

16

1

theory.

2

financially.

3

This isn't a result that's benefitting my clients
It's just merely getting compliance with the law.

And, Your Honor, finally, I would just submit that

4

the Court does have legal authority to award this remedy if you

5

determine that it's proper under the analysis, the Private

6

Attorney General Doctrine analysis and in thinking about that,

7

it really is an equitable remedy and if you think about who

8

should bear the financial consequences of the County's illegal

9

conduct in this case, should it be the homeowners who did

10

everything that they could for 10 years to get the County to

11

stop and to get the County to enforce the law or should it be

12

the County who should have undertaken that duty in the first

13

place?

14

that justice and equity argue for an award in this case.

15

you.

16
17

We'd just simply submit if you weigh those choices,

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Hunt.

Thank

I'll hear from the

County.

18

MR. TSAKALOS:

Thank you, Your Honor.

I'll try to be

19

brief.

The plaintiffs have prevailed in this case and I don't

20

have a problem with that.

21

put this in prospective.

22

litigation and maybe they're so personally involved they don't

23

see things.

24

about two, two and a half months ago when they filed their

25

motion for fees and the first thing I did was start scratching

I congratulate them but I need to
Counsel has been involved in

The first time I became involved on this case was

17

1

my head and the next thing I did is I read the cases and I know

2

your concern about what transpired here but I think we need to

3

look at what the Supreme Court said in particular.

4

Hermes even though the way the plaintiffs have approached this

5

motion before you is to put us all in the same basket.

6

Supreme Court didn't go there.

7

that the district court judge who found our actions proper made

8

a mistake.

9

that the plaintiffs contest the court's interpretation.

He was erroneous.

We are not

The

What the Supreme Court said was

It also said on Culbertson One
It

10

held in Culbertson 1 at paragraph 42, "We conclude the Judge's,

11

and Ken Jones' decisions were erroneous."

12

again regarding the 1070 East Street.

13

that were applied, the plaintiffs contend that the exception

14

was erroneous.

15

conclude the exceptions were erroneously granted."

16

to the County.

17

deliberately" at paragraph 56 but in its conclusion and the

18

record, the record says, we made a mistake that's been

19

rectified.

They used the term

The roadway standards

That's at paragraph 48.

The Court, "We
This is as

The court did say, "Hermes acted willfully and

20

Even in the Johnson vs. Hermes which is the

21

Culbertson Two case, the Court again says the County's decision

22

was erroneous.

23

take some comfort in what the Supreme Court actually found in

24

this matter in terms of our activities and in terms of issuing

25

and approving this project.

We made a mistake.

So I think the Court can

18

1

Now, on the Private Attorney General theory, I think

2

counsel has a problem when I look at their reply brief at page

3

7 to 9, I raised the defense that this was a discretionary

4

action, that we were entitled to immunity and at page 7 to 9

5

they take the argument, it wasn't discretionary because this is

6

not affecting basic governmental policymaking just as the Court

7

focused in its opening statements.

8

stretch this Private Attorney General theory and I just don't

9

see how it can get there because as I pointed out, I know my

10

dog analogy was simple but it would apply to a setback if we

11

decide a 20 foot setback is required, the landowner says 18 is

12

sufficient and the Court finds 19, we've got a fee driven

13

lawsuit going on.

14

plywood is put into a project.

15

says half inch, we have a lawsuit and attorney's fees are going

16

to drive these kinds of cases just like they do in the civil

17

rights arena.

18

It's brought backwards from a 2001 decision until today asking

19

for a very large sum of money involving the - I'd like to point

20

out to the Court, not only the action against the County, the

21

action against Hermes, but the action against a relative that

22

was involved here.

23

the case as well as the Court or these folks but I saw three

24

cases and three fees that they're asking for here.

25

I know they're trying to

It can be anything as simple as what kind of
We say 3/4 inch, the developer

This was not brought as a civil rights case.

I think it was the Croxfords.

I don't know

I want to touch a little bit on this Private Attorney
19

1

General theory.

The Supreme Court in Stewart relied on the

2

Sorano decision and as the Court pointed out, that California

3

cases have been codified on the Private Attorney General

4

theory.

5

disfavored approach.

6

accepted at Private Attorney General theory in general let

7

along against a governmental entity.

8

public service - back to the Public Service Commission in the

9

Private Attorney General theory under Barker vs. Public Service

The cases I cited to the court show it's basically a
Very few if any of the courts have

Even on remand of the

10

Commission, the court did not go off on the Private Attorney

11

General theory.

12

of the few rate payers created a multi-million dollar —

13

It went off on the common fund that the action

THE COURT:

But they said that even if it wasn't

14

enough, even if the common fund wasn't enough that they were

15

entitled to recover attorney's fees under the Private Attorney

16

General theory.

17

MR. TSAKALOS:

But they made the award there and

18

there's no Utah case that goes the opposite direction that

19

actually has awarded under the Private Attorney General theory.

20

As a matter of fact, both the parties in this case have cited

21

the Utahns for Better Dental Health out of Davis County on the

22

fluoride cases.

23

they sought under this Private AG theory.

24

in February he issued his other opinion on the remand, again

25

denying the Private Attorney General theory and in that

Judge Dawson denied them attorney's fees that
It was remanded and

20

1

particular case, we have health issues involved for literally

2

thousands and thousands of residents in Davis County and the

3

judge found that that did not transcend the personal interests

4

of these particular plaintiffs who brought the action.

5

was not sufficient to give them an award of fees and in here,

6

no matter how you want to argue it, there are two folks that

7

benefitted from this decision and that's what they sought and

8

that's what they got.

9

than that.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. HUNT:

That

I don't think I can belabor it any more

Anything else, Mr. Hunt?
Just briefly, Your Honor on the argument

12

that we're not Hermes, the record is clear that they acted hand

13

in hand with Hermes throughout this entire process.

14

the contractual indemnification from Hermes, they acceded to

15

all of Hermes demands and this is what we ended up with.

16

court in Culbertson One did condemn the County.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. HUNT:

They got

The

That's certainly the way I read it.
Not just Hermes and I don't need to read

19

the language but it's in paragraph 56 and they said that the

20

County should be condemned for violating its own ordinances in

21

this case.

22

Your Honor, we would just submit that justice and

23

equity do argue in favor of an award in this case under the

24

Private Attorney General Doctrine for all the reasons we've

25

said.

We don't think that this benefits just Elaina Culbertson
21

1

and Pearl Mybois.

We think it vindicated the important side

2

interest in being able to go to the enforcer of the laws and

3

require that enforcer to enforce them.

4

that duty ourselves in this case after we put them on notice.

5

That's what makes this case extraorcinary.

6

a mistake.

7

claiming.

8

why the Court condemned their conduct and that's the important

9

societal interest that we claim is being vindicated, was

We had to undertake

This was not simply

This is not simply, we didn't know what you were
They knew since 1995 and they did it anyway.

That's

10

vindicated in this case in addition to the fact that these are

11

public roads and every member of the public from now into the

12

future that travels on them will be traveling on roads that are

13

safer because of the result in this case.

14

Thank you, Your Honor.

15

THE COURT:

Thank you.

If there were a doctrine

16

either found in a statute or in an opinion that gave me

17

authority to award attorney's fees if the County willfully

18

violated its own ordinances, I would not hesitate to do that in

19

this case; however, I remain unconvinced that this is a good

20

case for application of the Private Attorney General's

21

Exception to the general rule in Utah which is that I don't

22

award attorney's fees to prevailing parties.

23

the approach that I've taken is to look at the specific results

24

obtained in the litigation and determine who benefitted

25

primarily.

And once again,

I

Did the public primarily benefit or did these
22

1

private litigants primarily benefit?

Stewart says, "Courts

2

have awarded attorney's fees to a party as a Private Attorney

3

General when vindication of a strong or society important

4

public policy takes place and the necessary costs of doing so,

5

transcends the individual's pecuniary interest to an extent

6

requiring subsidation.

7

interest in the sense of award of money damages but there was

8

an individual interest pursued in this case in terms of

9

improving access to a specific parcel of property and what I

10

think that language requires me to do is look at the results

11

and weigh and determine, you know, who ultimately benefitted

12

from the specific results in this case?

13

individual plaintiffs or was it the society as a whole?

14

was even, then I think that - if it was at least even the

15

Private Attorney General Exception would apply but if you have

16

a situation where the interests vindicated on behalf of the

17

individuals, whether pecuniary or not, but the specific results

18

obtained, whether it benefitted them as compared to society as

19

a whole, I think it's probably 90/10 in favor of the individual

20

litigants in this case and because of that, I don't think that

21

it's fair to say that they were out there representing the

22

public as a whole and should be reimbursed their attorney's

23

fees.

24

Hunt, even though this is a compelling case to do something to

25

help out these individuals.

Now there was no individual pecuniary

Was it these
If it

I just view the exception more narrowly than you do, Mr.

I don't see it within my power so
23

1

I'm going to deny the Motion for Attorney's fees.

2

County to prepare the order if you would please.

3
4
5

MR. TSAKALOS:

I ask the

There's also a Motion to Strike.

you want to make any order...
THE COURT:

In light of my decision, I don't think

6

it's worth spending a lot of time on that.

7

your order I've denied the Motion to Strike because I think

8

it's all things that I can consider in this kind of an

9

eguitable evaluation.

10 |

Do

For purposes of

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25 I
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ALAYNA J. CULBERTSON and
DIANE PEARL MEIBOS

ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AWARD
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
and
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY and KEN JONES, as Director of
Development Services for Salt Lake County,
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vs.
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Limited Partnership
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Civil No. 950905166AA
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The above-entitled civil action came on regularly for oral argument on May 12, 2006 at
10:a.m. on the following motions: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs and Litigation
Expenses (filed March 10,2006), and (2) defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portion of
Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts (filed March 24, 2006). Appearing and arguing on behalf of the
plaintiffs were their attorneys Jeffrey Hunt and David Reymann of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee &
Loveless.

Appearing and arguing on behalf of the defendants were TJ. Tsakalos and Donald H.

Hansen, Deputy District Attorneys of the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office. Prior to the
oral argument, the court had reviewed all the memoranda submitted by the parties' counsel, the cases
cited therein, and selected portions of the exhibits attached thereto.
Based upon the arguments, memoranda and authorities presented by the parties and their
counsel, and finding good cause therefor, the court hereby finds and ORDERS as follows:
1.

With respect to Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Attorney Fees, Costs and Litigation
Expenses, there is no applicable statute or contractual provision which expressly
permits the award of fees to the plaintiffs herein.

2.

With respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "third-party litigation
rule," the court finds that the rule recognizes that attorney fees may be a measure of
damages, but the rule is not a substantive basis for awarding attorneys fees to be
found within the court's inherent equitable authority.

3.

Further, the court finds that there was no "common fund" created by plaintiffs'
action in this case from which attorney fees can or should be paid.

4.

Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "third-party
litigation rule," the court finds that there was no claim for recovery of damages or
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fees asserted by plaintiffs in their complaint herein as amended to date.
5.

With respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private attorney
general doctrine," in order to grant an award of attorney fees and costs under that
doctrine, the court must first determine whether the plaintiffs' legal action, and the
specific relief secured as a result of the plaintiffs' action, primarily benefitted the
plaintiffs individually or, rather, primarily benefitted the public at large.

6.

Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private
attorney general doctrine," that doctrine is not intended to extend the exception to the
American rule - which rule restricts awards of attorney fees in civil ligation to cases
where such an award is expressly authorized by contract or statute - to any case in
which a citizen's legal action effectively restrains an unreasonable exercise of
governmental power, even though such a legal action may incidentally result in a
general, indirect benefit to the public at large.

1.

Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private
attorney general doctrine," the plaintiffs in the underlying litigation sought and
obtained relief for their "special private injury," not for vindication of a broad public
interest.

8,

Further, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under the "private
attorney general doctrine," in analyzing whether the individual plaintiffs, as opposed
to the general public, primarily benefitted from the prosecution of this action by the
plaintiffs, the Court finds here that plaintiffs as individuals primarily benefitted from
the relief they secured, and not the general public. Specifically, the court concludes

- PAGE 3 OF 5 -

—11

that approximately ninety percent (90%) of the benefit of the relief obtained inured
to the plaintiffs as individuals, while approximately ten percent (10%) of the benefit
may have inured to the general public. Thus, plaintiffs have failed to meet their
burden under the private attorney general doctrine of showing that the public at large
primarily benefitted from the plaintiffs' prosecution of this action.
9.

Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs' Statement of
Facts is denied.

THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys Fees, Costs and Litigation Expenses is
DENIED.

2.

Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs'
Statement of Facts is DENIED.

DATED this

C

day of

/ ^ ^ ^ ^

2006.

BY THE COURT:

- PAGE 4 OF 5 -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1 hereby certify that the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS5 MOTION FOR
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS and DEFENDANTS5 MOTION TO STRIKE
was duly served upon the following by U.S. First Class Mail, postage prepaid:
Ronald G. Russell, Esq.
Jeffrey J. Hunt, Esq.
David C. Reymann, Esq.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Mark O. Morris, Esq.
David P. Williams, Esq.
SNELL & WILMER

15 West South Temple Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City UT 84101
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants

on this
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